Imagining Europe: The Quest for Identity in
Nineteenth Century Russian Literature

                                                              

 

Peter Engholm

Monash University, September 2000

 

 

 

ABSTRACT:

This paper looks at Russia’s quest for identity in its relation to Europe, and focuses mainly on how the issue was dealt with in nineteenth century Russian literature. It aims to answer the question whether the Russian people saw themselves a ‘Europeans’. The conclusion states that the debate in the nineteenth century was merely one part of a never-ending quest for Russian identity; a debate that did not establish a ‘European’ consciousness among the Russian people, rather it showed the confusion that existed and the dilemma the people faced, and still face today.

 

KEYWORDS:

Russia, European identity, Westerners, Slavophiles

 

FULL TEXT:

Throughout the last couple of centuries, Russia has been considered as one of the Great Powers in the world - a world in which Europe traditionally was the main center of attraction: politically, socially and culturally. However, unlike the other Great Powers in Europe - Great Britain, France, Prussia and Austria-Hungary - it has continually been struggling with its identity and its place in the world, and especially its relation to Europe. As noted by Tchoubarian[1], to what extent Russia belongs to Europe is a problem that has for many decades served as a subject of controversy in Russian society, and this issue has provoked numerous discussions in Europe as well.

This paper aims to look at Russia’s quest for identity in its relation to Europe. Because it is a vast topic which would necessitate a detailed look into various political, social, and cultural aspects of the Russian society throughout the centuries, as well as covering a range of various international aspects which has affected Russia’s view of themselves (for example, Europe’s view of Russia and the political involvement of Russia in European affairs), this paper focuses only on how the issue was dealt with in the Russian literature during a period in time when the debate was particularly virile and altering: the nineteenth century.

Thus, this paper aims to answer the question of whether the Russian people saw themselves as ’European’ or not, and whether adapting European values and ideas should therefore be justified. A brief introduction to the history of Europe and Russia is followed by a discussion of the importance of the legacy of Peter the Great in forming and developing opinions in the nineteenth century, and the paper then turns to a discussion of the Russian literature in this period that dealt with the issue of Russian and Europe. The main part of this paper deals with the rise of two opposing groups of opinions: the ‘Westerners’ and the ‘Slavophiles’, and various primary sources are used to compare and contrast arguments put forward by members of these groups.

The conclusion sums up the arguments put forward for Russia’s place in Europe. It shall be argued that the debate in the nineteenth century was merely one part of a never-ending quest for Russian identity that has been present for many centuries, and still is today, although, as noted by Tchoubarian[2], the nature of the discussion constantly has been changing at various stages of world and European history. To better understand the views of the nineteenth century, however, it is necessary to first discuss some of the historical notions of Russia and its connection to Europe:

Russia: East of Europe, West of Asia

The question of Russia’s place in the world has been a central issue in many discussions since the beginnings of Russian civilisation. Did it belong to Asia or Europe? Lying between these two great and divergent civilisations, the idea often emerged of Russia as an original alloy of these two - some sort of ‘synthesis’ of Western and Eastern values. Because of this connection both to Europe and Asia, clashes often occurred between advocates of Eastern and Western values. For example, if Russia adopted European values and political systems, critics were likely to point out the dangers of adopting values from a ‘decadent Western culture’ that would conflict with the ‘traditional’ and special Russian culture. Similarly, if Russia did not follow European trends and adopt European ideas and systems, it was argued that Russia would be set on an inevitable path of backwardness, which, as it would be shown, was to be the case in the late nineteenth century[3].

Due to these clashes between West and East values, Russia has never been able to fully find its place in the world. Succumbing the Tartar invasion of the thirteenth century, Russia was virtually cut off from the West for over two hundred years. It barely felt the impact of either the Renaissance or the Reformation, and remained largely immune to the Enlightenment (although, as shall be shown, many of the ideas formulated in the nineteenth century had their roots in theories from the Enlightenment period). Its political systems have never had their counterparts in Western civilisations, and the revolution of 1917 again set Russia on a path that diverged sharply from the West[4].

Still, Russia has constantly been involved in European affairs, and various periods in Russian history have seen much influence of Western values and ideas. They have formed an integral part of Europe by sharing a common Christian heritage, and though uneven and fluctuating, Russia’s commercial links and military and diplomatic entanglements with Europe have played a vital role in her development[5]. From the middle of the eighteenth century, Russia was considered as one of the ‘Great Powers’, and if one goes back a hundred years before Alexander II, to the time of the Seven Years War, nobody at that time thought Russia was different from other European countries[6].

The geographic border of Eastern Europe has constantly been redefined. In the middle ages, the borders were defined in terms of ‘Christendom versus Islam’ - hence, Europe’s frontier to the East was held by the Habsburgs against the Turks[7]. In the seventeenth century, the Don River was generally defined as the natural border between Europe and Asia. Later, Count Vassili Tatishchev and the Swedish traveller Stralenberg argued that the border should run along the Ural mountain range[8]. Even the great nineteenth century leader Metternich stated that Asia began at the Landstrasse - the road running out of Vienna towards the east, hence not including Russia in a European context[9].

This brief introduction to the history of Russia’s connection with Europe helps understanding the problems and confusion of identity that faced the Russian people in the nineteenth century, and which are the roots to the clash that was to develop between the so called ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’ in the 1840s. The images of Europe in this century, however, did not only stem from the old questions of identity, but were also strongly rooted in the legacy of Peter the Great, which is discussed next.

Peter the Great and the ‘Westernisation’ of Russia

The terms ‘Westernisation’ and ‘Europeanism’ have often been used interchangeably to explain the planned adaptation and integration of Western (European) liberal systems, ideas, culture and traditions into Russian society.  As argued by Oliva[10], ‘Westernisation’ was certainly a theme in Russian history before Peter the Great entered the stage as ruler of Russia in the eighteenth century, but it was a subdued theme. Peter the Great was the one who took ‘Westernisation’ to new levels, trying to create a Russian-European society, hence in some way making Russia a part of Europe. Consider P. Y. Chaadayer’s (one of the initiators of the debate between ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’) statement in his Apology of a Madman from 1837:

Peter the Great found only a blank page when he came to power, and with a strong hand he wrote on it the words Europe and Occident: from that time on we were part of Europe and of the Occident[11].

The most important step taken by Peter’s government, which had considerable impact on the future of Russia, was its thorough and methodical effort to establish a modern system of education and to bring European culture and technology to the Russian people[12]. As argued by Malia[13], he was “the pledge that Russia possessed the resources for great accomplishment in the future, and was the guarantee of the final success of ‘Europeanism’ in Russia”.

After Peter died, there were no talks of turning back, of giving up on the efforts to educate the children of the service nobility in European science, technology, arts and culture. European culture, Raeff argues, henceforth became a prerequisite for membership in the ruling elite[14].

But the decades that followed the great ‘transforming’ star were problematic and paradoxical. Although the ruling elite responded enthusiastically to the cultural challenge and adapted so well to imported Western innovations that within two generations they were making contributions of their own to the new culture of modern Russia, Peter’s reforms never penetrated to the heart of the Russian society or the Russian nation. The fundamental paradox, which importance grew steadily during the eighteenth century and proved decisive in the nineteenth, was that the government, eager to encourage and organise production under its own control, continually encouraged private initiative on the part of certain individuals. The combination of social institutions in an autocratic regime did not succeed in creating a long-run impetus for a move towards a more European model of society.
It might all have worked well during the powerful ruling of Peter the Great, but the creative energy for transforming the Russian society, which mainly came from the service nobility, was only a short-term phenomenon as the service nobility’s overriding concern was immediate profit, and it also became increasingly isolated from traditional Russian culture and ancient tradition that had shaped Russian life and was still a major source of inspiration for the ‘masses’[15].

Hence, the period after Peter the Great saw the split between the two poles grow steadily, for ‘Westernisation’ or for Russian traditions, although it would take another couple of decades - until the mid-nineteenth century - before these views were openly debated in the literature and public life.

Alongside this development of opposing ideas and visions for the future of Russia, was the critical political development in Europe as a whole. From the late 1780s until 1848, Europe was riven by massive changes: empires rose and fell, states and rulers were overthrown with terrifying rapidity, and the result was that those who came of age ten or fifteen years apart entered a very different world from their predecessors or their successors, and they knew it[16].

The importance of the French revolution for Europe lay in the fact that during this time the essential principles of democracy, freedom and human rights were formulated and proclaimed. The European states were left to go their own way and to build up their national identities. Hence, Russia in the end of the eighteenth century saw a Europe becoming more and more aware of itself and its place in the world. Again, Russia was left behind in their own struggle of identity and relation to Europe. While most European countries adopted a democratic system of justice, Imperial Russia did not change.

Hence, the cast was set for yet another era of confusion, and this paper now turns to discuss various developments in the nineteenth century and what impact these had on the Russian quest for identity. It starts off with discussing how the changing form and increasing scope of Russian literature eventually triggered the rise of an intensive debate concerning Russia and Europe, which divided the Russian intelligentsia into two main groups of opinions: the ‘Westerners’ and the ‘Slavophiles’:

The Quest for Identity in Nineteenth Century Russian Literature

The dominant media for the discussion of Russia’s relation to Europe in the nineteenth century was undoubtedly Russian literature. By 1800, Russian literature had established a tradition of representing real-life problems, and in the legacy of Peter the Great, eighteenth century writers had enriched its language with new elements. In the nineteenth century, it became a congenial medium for the discussion of political and social issues, not least the issue of Russia’s identity[17]. Russian intellectuals began more and more to see themselves as voices for the oppressed and inarticulate lower classes[18], and their opinions were articulated primarily in the novel and short story forms borrowed from Western Europe, but also in poems, letters and dramas[19]. Between 1800 and 1830, the Russian society was heavily influenced by European ideas, primarily rooted in French rationalism and, later on, German idealism.

The Age of Realism, generally considered as the culmination of the literary synthesis of earlier generations, began around 1850, and saw the appearance of great writers such as Aleksandr Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov, Nikolay Gogol, Vissarion Belinsky, Fjodor Dostoyevkiy, Leo Tolstoy and Alksandr Ostrovskiy[20]. Many of these writers took up the issue of Russia’s identity in their various publications and prose. For example, the history of Karamzin, the poetry of Pushkin, and the fiction of Gogol all reflected the growing maturity of a distinctively Russian yet unmistakably European high culture. They too responded to cultural events emanating primarily from France, Germany, and also Britain, but were at the same time being increasingly conscious of Russia’s own national identity[21].

With this upsurge of literature, theological issues and issues of national identity grew steadily stronger in the Russian society. The theologically curious turned both to secular studies of the Western as well as the Byzantine and native roots of modern Russian civilisation. The result was a theological renaissance, which eventually led to the clash between ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’[22]. Waller argues, that by the 1830s, Russia’s relationship to and place in Europe was among the most vigorously debated concerning Russia’s future[23], but it was not until 1842, when the two groups had become more political in their opinions, that one can see the culmination of the debate. So what was it all about?

The ‘Westerners’:

In brief, the ‘Westerners’ defended most of Peter the Great’s ambitions of ‘Europeanisation’ in Russia, and believed that the adoption of selective Western rationalism - cultural, social and institutional, should be the focus of Russia’s attention in the future, and in which Russia’s identity should find its inspiration and development[24]. They argued for Peter, for the West, and for individualism, signified liberalism, written constitution, legal guarantees of civil liberties and eventually some form of democracy[25]. This view was clearly supported by Chaadayer, and can be seen in the previously quoted ‘Apology of a Madman’, in which he writes the following:

We are situated to the east of Europe; that is a positive fact, but it does not mean that we have ever been a part of the East…  I believe that the age of blind loves has passed and that nowadays one owes one’s country the truth. I love my country in the way Peter the Great taught me to love it[26].

As noted by Waller[27], and which has previously been argued, the ‘Westerner’ position drew much of its intellectual armory from the Enlightenment, but also from the philosophic idealism and the romantic nationalism of the West. Vassarion Belinsky’s Letter to N.V. Gogol, published in 1847, is one literary example of extreme ‘Westerner’ thought from this century[28].

The ‘Slavophiles’:

Contrasting the ‘Westerners’ position were the ‘Slavophiles’ who stressed what was distinctive in Russia, and who believed that the future of Russia lay in her return to her authentic past, rather than in further ‘unnatural’ imitation of the foreigner (Europe). They rejected the West’s ‘atomic individualism’ (meaning political liberation) and most of the above-mentioned elements put forward by the ‘Westerners’[29].

Alexei S. Khomyakov (1804-1860), champion of the ‘Slavophiles’, saw no sensible answers to the problems in Russia in Western examples of loss of faiths, violent conflicts of opinion and the evils of individualism and materialism[30], and Alexander Herzen, father of Russian socialism, comments on his experiences of Europe by writing the following:

Do not, I beg, make a mistake: it is not happiness, not distraction, not rest, not even personal safety that I have found here: indeed I do not know who could find in Europe today happiness or rest, rest in the midst of an earthquake, happiness in the midst of desperate struggle[31].

Herzen also states that: “I see the inevitable doom of old Europe and feel no pity for anything that now exists”[32], and V. O. Klyuchevsky, one of the greatest Russian historians, attacks the ‘Westerners’ reliance on Peter the Great as the initiator of Europeanism by stating that:

He [Peter] was not a blind admirer of the west; on the contrary he mistrusted it, and was not deluded into thinking that he could establish cordial relations with the west, for he knew that the West mistrusted his country and was hostile to it… Peter once said: we need Europe for a few decades; later we must turn our back on it[33].

Although not a strict ‘Slavophile’, Nikolai Danilevsky contributed to the discussion with his book Russia and Europe from 1864, seeking to solve the issue of Russia’s relationship to and within Europe by presenting history as an ‘organic’ process. He saw Europe as typifying the Germanic-Romanic cultural-historical type that arose from the ruins of the Roman Empire, and Russia as the center of the Slavonic cultural-historical type which had inherited the traditions of Greek-Byzantine civilization. Hence, by presenting Russia and Europe as two different cultural-historic types, each with its own specific heritage and mentality, he concluded that Russia should not, and could not be Europeanised. European values, associated with the Greek-Roman tradition, were regarded by him as alien to the true Russian spirit and mentality[34].

Later in the nineteenth century, ‘Slavophilism’ took another form in ‘Pan-Slavism’, whose advocates spoke out for the mission of Slavic people and Orthodoxy in restoring and revivifying Europe. They argued that Russia with its Slav heritage should seek to promote their cause and to protect them and free them from the rules of their oppressors, for example, the Turks. Fyodor Dostoievsky is one famous Russian writer who expressed Pan-Slavic ideas clearly in his private correspondence[35].

There were, of course, writers that took neither an extreme ‘Westerner’ not ‘Slavophile’ position. These writers tried to promote a national consciousness, regardless of whether that involved adapting European ideas, values and systems, or not. For them, the issue was not so much to as whether Russia belonged to Europe, but the mission for Russian in the whole world. The following quote is and extract from Peter Iakovlevich Chaadev’s Letters on the philosophy of history, in which he states that:

We do not belong to any of the great families of the human race; we are neither of the west nor of the East, and we have not the traditions either. Placed, as it were, outside of time, we have not been touched by the universal education of the human race[36].

Chaadev is delineating the problem of Russia’s relationship to the West and its role in history of human culture and progress, and further states that: “We are one of those nations which do not appear to be an integral part of the human race, but exists only in order to teach some great lesson to the world”[37].

In the end of the nineteenth century, the debate between ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’ had given way for more urgent political matters of attention, such as the Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war, leading to its declining role in European affairs, and the rise of Socialist and Marxist ideas that eventually took Russia to revolution in 1917 and almost completely broke any existing link to Europe.

It is important to realise that Russian literature in the nineteenth century followed closely the development of events in the national and international political arena. As European countries became more democratic and advanced, they also became more distinct from a technological and social backward and stagnative Imperial Russia. Logically, the outcome would be a surge of critical opinions and intensified voices for reforms. The purpose of this paper, however, has not been to discuss the reasons behind the Russian literature in the nineteenth century, rather the contents of it, relating to Russian’s quest for identity and its place in Europe.

Conclusion

To conclude the discussion, it can be said that a variety of opinions and ideas existed and were proposed for Russia’s place within, and relationship to Europe. Some argued that Russia belonged to Europe, and justified the attempts by Peter the Great to ‘Westernise’ the country. Others argued that Russia was different from Europe - culturally, historically and spiritually, and should not adopt western cultures, systems and ideas. These contrasting opinions were nothing new for nineteenth century Russia, though. They have always existed, and exist today when the Russia that the ‘Slavophiles’ defended is a mere shadow of its imperial former self. Hence, analysing nineteenth century Russian literature does not provide an answer to whether the Russians saw themselves as Europeans - rather it verifies the confusion that existed, the dilemma the people faced, and the different opinions present.

Does Russia belong to Europe? If no answer can be found, maybe the Russian people can find some salvation in the words by Konstantin Dmirtrievich Kavelin, who wrote the following in one of his letters to Fjodor Dostoievsky:

I dream… of one thing only: that we stop talking about moral, spiritual Christian truth and begin to act, behave, live according to that truth! This will not turn us into Europeans, but we shall cease being Orientals and shall become in fact what we are by nature - Russians[38].

 

LITERATURE SURVEY:

This paper mainly deals with the view of Europe and Westernisation in Russian literature during the nineteenth century. The main body of the paper is concerned with the two opposing sides of the issue that arose in the 1840s, the ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’.

Malia, in his book Alexander Herzen and birth of Russian Socialism, examines (in one chapter) in detail the two opposing views, but does so from the viewpoint of Alexander Herzen, the founder of Russian socialism. Malia’s book as a whole is written as a biography of Herzen, and Malia does not discuss much of this issue within the Russian literature; rather he is concerned with Herzens transition from initially adopting a ‘Westerner’ view to within only a few years time being closer to the ‘Slavophile’ view of Russia and Europe. His main argument is that the Slavophile view corresponded better to Herzen’s own patriotic preoccupations, which were based on national sentiments, and in the end, this lead to the formulation of Herzen’s socialist stance. Malia points out that this is the second ‘transition’ from left to right for Herzen - the first being his move from idealism to romanticism. Although this paper has not been too concerned with the life of Herzen, his views of the relationship between Russia and Europe has benefited the topic. Likewise, Malia’s detailed explanation of the ‘Westerner’ and ‘Slavophile’ view has added extra understanding to the issue.

The most beneficial literary source used for the paper has undoubtedly been Oliva’s Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev. This book is a collection of primary sources from the period of Peter the Great to the modern era of Russian literature. The book is not presenting any arguments in some forms; rather it is an invaluable source to nineteenth century Russian literature. It also has a section with ‘Westerner’ and ‘Slavophile’ influenced documents, in which the various notions of Europe can be deducted and analysed.

Raeff’s undergoes a thorough analysis of Imperial Russia in his Understanding imperial Russia: state and society in the old regime. He focuses on the role of the Russian elite, and how this elite’s thoughts and actions changed and developed from the time of Peter the Great to the end of the nineteenth century. One of Raeff’s main arguments is that Russia’s youths and elite have been very much influenced by Western values and ideas, and he is clearly writing his book from a pro-European (pro-‘Westerners’) perspective; not so much arguing why pro-Russian feelings developed and existed, but rather why not pro-European feelings became stronger and the most dominant in the long-run. Raeff’s argument thus sometimes may seem biased, but the relevance of his historiography cannot be discarded. Raeff also discusses the tsars’ attitudes towards Europeanisation, arguing that pro-Europe tsars failed to convey their message to the Russian people, but only succeeded in reaching the service nobility, who only were motivated by short-term benefits. Unlike for example Malia and Oliva, for Raeff the clash between ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’ is not the means to the end, but rather the end itself. He sees the vast Russian literature in the nineteenth century as the ‘final’ conflict between pro- and against Westernisation in Russia, and the ‘end’ to the question of Russia and Europe, as the debate eventually lead to cries for reforms and the 1917 revolution, which saw the final detachment of Russia from Europe.

Tchoubarian (The European idea in history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: a view from Moscow), on the other hand, views the outburst in Russian literature during the nineteenth century as the ‘beginning’, or a starting point, of Russian consciousness and identity. Tchoubarian argues that the tendencies for pro-Europeanisation in Russia has been steadily declining during in Imperial Russia, although he allows for a brief period of nourishment in the mid-nineteenth century due to the nationalistic feelings and revolutions that were strong in Europe then. It is clear that Tchoubarian’s focus is on socialist and Marxist literature; which is not very related to the nineteenth century debate about Russia’s place in Europe. For this paper, a section has been used that discusses a scientific, historical way of justifying the ‘Slavophile’ views; that the Russian people has always been different from the European people- hence, Russia should not be considered European, but plainly Russian. He also argues that any discussion today about the relations between Russia and Europe, and the mission of Russia, is plainly a continuation of the old debates of ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’. The author of this paper agrees with Tchoubarian on this point.

Broers (Europe after Napoleon) and Thomson (Europe Since Napoleon) are - as the titles of their books indicate - chiefly concerned with the legacy of the French Revolution and what impact this had on the future state making in Europe. Their main argument is that the French revolution created a sense of stability and order in a previously chaotic Europe; but it was a stability and order that Russia did not enjoy or fully could participate in. Hence, Russias internal structure and inability to follow the ‘European trend’ paved way for her backwardness in the nineteenth century. These two authors briefly discuss the notion of Europe in Russian literature, but mainly try to explain the political development of Europe (without Russia) after the French revolution.

 

Any reproduction or distribution of this text is prohibited without express permission by the author. Please contact peter@engholm.nu for permission or further information.

 

REFERENCES:

Broers, M., Europe after Napoleon, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996)

Chaadaev, P.I., ‘Letters on the philosophy of history’ (first letter), in M. Raeff, Russian Intellectual history: an anthology, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966)

Chaadayer, P.Y., ‘Apology of a Madman’, in L.J. Oliva, (Ed.), Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, (Boston: Heath, 1965)

Curtis, G.E., ‘Russia: A country study’, Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/rutoc.html#ru0004, July 1996.

Herzen, A., ‘From the other shore’, in L.J. Oliva, (Ed.), Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, (Boston: Heath, 1965)

Kavelin, K.D., ‘A Letter to F.M. Dostoevsky’, in M. Raeff, Russian Intellectual history: an anthology, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966)

Klyuchevsky, V.O., ‘Peter and the West’, from Kurs russkoi isorii, in L.J. Oliva, (Ed.), Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, (Boston: Heath, 1965)

Loe, M.L., ‘Redefining the intellectual’s role: Maksim Gorky and the Sreda circle’ in E.W. Clowes, S.D Kassow, & J.L. Clowes, For Public identity in Late Imperial Russia, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991)

Malia, M., Alexander Herzen and birth of Russian Socialism, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965)

Oliva, L.J. (Ed.), Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, (Boston: Heath, 1965)

Raeff, M., Understanding imperial Russia: state and society in the old regime, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984)

Taylor A.J.P., From Napoleon to the Second International: Essays on Nineteenth Century Europe, edited by C. Wrigley, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993)

Tchoubarian, A. The European idea in history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: a view from Moscow, (Ilford, Essex, England: Frank Cass & Co., 1994)

Thomson, D., Europe Since Napoleon, (England: Penguin books, 1970)

Waller, B. (Ed.), Themes in Modern European history 1830-1890, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990)

 

FOOTNOTES:



[1] Alexander Tchoubarian, The European idea in history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries : a view from Moscow, (Ilford, Essex, England: Frank Cass & Co., 1994), p.3.

[2] Tchoubarian, The European idea in history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries : a view from Moscow, p.2.

[3] Ibid., pp.3-4.

[4] B. Waller (Ed.), Themes in Modern European history 1830-1890, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p.159.

[5] Waller, Themes in Modern European history 1830-1890, p.159.

[6] A. J. P. Taylor, From Napoleon to the Second International: Essays on Nineteenth Century Europe, edited by C. Wrigley, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), p.305.

[7] D. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, (England: Penguin books, 1970), p.85.

[8] Tchoubarian, The European idea, p.6.

[9] Thomson, p.85.

[10] L .J. Oliva (Ed.), Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, (Boston: Heath, 1965), p.1.

[11] P.Y. Chaadayer, ‘Apology of a Madman’, in L. J. Oliva, (Ed.), Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, p.18.

[12] M. Raeff, Understanding imperial Russia : state and society in the old regime, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p.50.

[13] M. Malia, Alexander Herzen and birth of Russian Socialism, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), p.97.

[14] Raeff, p.51.

[15] Raeff, Understanding imperial Russia: state and society in the old regime, pp.53-75.

[16] M. Broers, Europe after Napoleon, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p.3.

[17] G. E. Curtis, ‘Russia: A country study’, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/rutoc.html#ru0004, Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, July 1996.

[18] M.L Loe, ‘Redefining the intellectual’s role: Maksim Gorky and the Sreda circle’ in E.W. Clowes, S.D Kassow, & J.L. Clowes, For Public identity in Late Imperial Russia, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p.290.

[19] Curtis.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Waller, Themes in Modern European history 1830-1890, p.161.

[22] Raeff, Understanding imperial Russia: state and society in the old regime, p.154.

[23] Waller, Themes in Modern European history 1830-1890, p.161.

[24] Raeff, pp.280-282.

[25] Malia, Alexander Herzen and birth of Russian Socialism, pp.282-283.

[26] Chaadayer, ‘Apology of a Madman’, p.20.

[27] Waller, pp.161-162.

[28] See L.J. Oliva, (Ed.), Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, p.93.

[29] Malia, Alexander Herzen and birth of Russian Socialism, pp.282-283.

[30] Oliva, Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, p.99.

[31] A. Herzen, ‘From the other shore’, in Oliva, Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, p.101.

[32] Ibid., p.102.

[33] V.O. Klyuchevsky, ‘Peter and the West’, from Kurs russkoi isorii, in Oliva, Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, p.24.

[34] Tchoubarian, The European idea in history, pp.69-72.

[35] Taylor, From Napoleon to the Second International: Essays on Nineteenth Century Europe, p.307,
cf. Oliva, Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, p.117.

[36] P. I. Chaadaev, ‘Letters on the philosophy of history’ (first letter), in M. Raeff, Russian Intellectual history: an anthology, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p.162.

[37] Ibid., p.164.

[38] K. D. Kavelin, ‘A Letter to F.M. Dostoevsky’, in M. Raeff, Russian Intellectual history: an anthology, p.321.